Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1989

John W. Jarman and Helene B. Jarman v. Reagan
Outdoor Advertising Company : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Douglas T. Hall; Attorney for Appellant.
Jon C. Heaton; Ronald E. Nehring; Don R. Schow; Attorneys for Respondents.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, John W. Jarman and Helene B. Jarman v. Reagan Outdoor Advertising Company, No. 890106 (Utah Court of
Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1611

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

U I M n WWuni u r H r r c n u g

BRIEF

JTAH
)OCUMENT
CPU
A*9
)UCKET NO.

0H-t3lO^
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JOHN W. JARMAN and HELENE B.
JARMAN,

Plaintiffs/Respondents,
Docket No. 890106-CA
Priority No. 14b

vs.

REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING
COMPANY,
Defendant/Appellant.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Douglas T. Hall, Esq.
Reagan Outdoor Advertising
1175 North 900 West
Salt Lake City, UT 84116

DEPOSITED BY Wfc
STATE OF UTAH

AUG 17 1990

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
Jon c. Heaton (1444)
Ronald E. Nehring (2374)
Don R. Schow (5343)
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 524-1000
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/
Respondents

FILED
JUN301989

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JOHN W. JARMAN and HELENE B.
JARMAN,
Plaintiffs/Respondents,
Docket No. 890106-CA
Priority No. 14b

vs.
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING
COMPANY,
Defendant/Appellant.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Douglas T. Hall, Esq.
Reagan Outdoor Advertising
1175 North 900 West
Salt Lake City, UT 84116
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
Jon C. Heaton (1444)
Ronald E. Nehring (2374)
Don R. Schow (5343)
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 524-1000
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/
Respondents

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

................................

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMEN'
•qcjr-K^

DF----V..':' '.

............................

V™"-H;W

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW
STATEMENT ' r VHE G~Sr
SUMM.",:*'. •
ARGUMENT

-.V:T-MJ-~\-

........

.

POINT I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED
THAT THE REAGAN LEASE IS AMBIGUOUS ....

POINT II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT WAS BASED
ON A PROPER AND ACCURATE ASSESSMENT
OF THE FACTS PRESENTED AT TRIAL

POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AS
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND SUPPORT
ITS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ITS JUDGMENT
-" --•„•-,-,- -v T W E JARMANS
CONCLUSIOI-

.

-l-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
Page
American Bonding Co. v. Nelson,
763 P.2d 814, 816 (Utah App. 1988)
Copper State Leasing v. Blacker Appliance & Furniture,
770 P.2d 88, (Utah App. 1988)

8
10

Crowther v. Carter, 767 P.2d 129, 131 (Utah App. 1989) .. 12
General Glass Corp. v. Mast Const. Co., 766 P.2d 429
(Utah App. 1988)
Power Sys. & C o n t r o l s v. K e i t h ' s E l e c , 765 P.2d 5, 9
(Utah App. 1988)

13
9

Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998 (Utah App. 1989)

13

Sorenson v. Beers, 614 P.2d 159, 160 (Utah 1980)

13

STATUTES AND RULES CITED
Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

2

Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

12, 14

Utah Code Ann.,

1

§ 78-2-3(j), (Supp. 1988)

-ii-

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JOHN W. JARMAN and HELENE B.
JARMAN,
Plaintiffs/Respondents,
Docket No. 890106-CA
Priority No. 14b

vs .
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING
COMPANY,
Defendant/Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This Court has jurisdiction over this action by virtue
of the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-3(j).

This is an

appeal from a final judgment of the Third District Court
ordering defendant to remove its billboards from plaintiffs'
property and from an order denying defendants' Motion to Amend
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
There are only three issues presented to this Court
for review:
1.

Was the District Court correct in its determina-

tion that the Reagan lease was ambiguous?

2.

Was the District Court's judgment that the facts

presented at trial preponderated in favor of the plaintiffs
clearly erroneous?
3.

Are the District Court's Findings of Fact

supported by the evidence presented at trial?
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW
Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which reads as
follows:
Rule 52. Findings by the court.
(a) Effectc In all actions tried upon
the facts without a jury or with an advisory
jury, the court shall find the facts
specially and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment
shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in
granting or refusing interlocutory
injunctions the court shall similarly set
forth the findings of fact and conclusions
of law which constitute the grounds of its
action. Requests for findings are not
necessary for purposes of review. Findings
of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses. The findings of a master, to the
extent that the court adopts them, shall be
considered as the findings of the court. It
will be sufficient if the findings of fact
and conclusions of law are stated orally and
recorded in open court following the close
of the evidence or appear in an opinion or
memorandum of decision filed by the court.
The trial court need not enter findings of
fact and conclusions of law in rulings on
motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b).
The court shall, however, issue a brief
written statement on the ground for its
decision on all motions granted under Rules
12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the
motion is based on more than one ground.

(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party
made not later than 10 days after entry of
judgment the court may amend its findings or
make additional findings and may amend the
judgment accordingly. The motion may be
made with a motion for a new trial pursuant
to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made
in actions tried by the court without a
jury, the question of the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the findings may
thereafter be raised whether or not the
party raising the question has made either a
motion to amend them, a motion for judgment,
or a motion for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action in trespass wherein the plaintiffs
alleged that certain billboards were relocated by defendant to
an area not contemplated in their lease agreement.

The matter

was presented to the trial court and tried without a jury. The
court entered judgment for the plaintiffs on October 18, 1988.
John W. Jarman and Helene B. Jarman purchased the
subject property in 1980.

(R. 209, p. 10) The property is

located adjacent to State Highway 224 near Kimball Junction in
Summit County, Utah.

(R. 209, p. 8) At the time the Jarmans

purchased the property, two advertising signs were already
located on the property.

(R. 209, p. 10)

Eventually, Mr. Jarman contacted Galaxy Outdoor
Advertising, Reagan's predecessor in interest, to inquire about
ownership of the signs.

(R. 209, p. 10; R. 47)

Sometime in

early 1982, Mr. Jarman entered into discussions with Terry
Reid, Reagan's representative, in an attempt to reach an
agreement regarding the signs.

(R. 209, p. 11)
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Galaxy had originally erected the signs in 1971
pursuant to two leases entered into between Galaxy and the
owner of the property at that time, one Swindle.

(R. 44 and

45) The description incorporated into the 1971 lease to define
the location of the signs was the same description used in the
1982 lease between Jarman and Reagan.

(R. 209, p. 30).

At the time Mr. Jarman entered into the lease
agreement with Reagan, he believed that the property
description contained in that agreement limited the signs to
the locations they occupied at that time.

(R. 209, pp. 12, 28,

29) Reagan admitted that once the billboards were in place,
their locations were defined.

(R. 209, pp. 47, 48)

It was

never Mr. Jarman's intention to permit Reagan the option of
moving the signs.

(R. 209, pp. 28, 29) Reagan never

communicated to Mr. Jarman that it believed it could use
portions of Mr. Jarman's property other than those upon which
the signs were originally situated.

(R. 209, p. 13).

In 1987, pursuant to the widening of State Highway 224
adjacent to the Jarman property, the State of Utah acquired a
strip of the Jarmans' property approximately 10 to 30 feet
wide.

(R. 209, p. 16) The State's right-of-way took a portion

of the property upon which the signs were located.
pp. 41, 42)

(R. 209,

The State informed Reagan that it would have to

remove the signs from the right-of-way.

-4-

(R. 209, p. 39)

Instead of removing the signs, Reagan, without
negotiation with Mr. Jarman or notice, moved the signs to a
portion of the Jarmans' property not contemplated by the lease
agreement.

(R. 209, pp. 28, 19) Mr. Jarman did not give

Reagan his consent to relocate the signs.

(R. 209, p. 19)

The Jarmans filed their Complaint against Reagan
seeking redress for Reagan's trespass on December 10, 1987.
Prior to trial on the merits, Reagan brought a motion for
summary judgment which the trial court denied.

Trial was held

before the Honorable Michael R. Murphy on September 9, 1988.
Both parties were represented by counsel and presented evidence
in the form of testimony and documentary evidence.
The trial court determined that the critical terms of
the lease were ambiguous and, based on the extrinsic evidence
presented by the parties at trial, entered judgment in favor of
the Jarmans and ordered that the billboard structures be
removed.

The Court entered its Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law.

Reagan moved to amend the Court's Findings

and Conclusions.

A hearing was held November 21, 1988 on

Reagan's Motion.

The motion was denied.

(R. 209, pp. 102-106)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The 1982 lease agreement is ambiguous. The
description of the leasehold, drafted by Reagan, can only be
understood through the examination of extrinsic evidence.
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The trial court examined extrinsic evidence, presented
by both parties, and determined that the leasehold was limited
to the specific location occupied by Reagan's billboards at the
time the 1982 Lease was executed.

The evidence presented was

more than sufficient to allow the Court to reach that
conclusion.

No error was committed by the trial court.

The trial court's findings of fact were sufficiently
based upon the evidence presented at trial.

Reagan has failed

to meet its burden in showing that the trial judge committed
clear error.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THE REAGAN
LEASE IS AMBIGUOUS
The lease entered into by the Jarmans and Reagan was
drafted by Reagan.

The description of the leasehold, contained

therein, was also drafted by Reagan.

(R. 209, pp. 18, 30) The

leasehold description states:
. . . in the County of Summit, State of Utah
and more particularly described as follows:
State Hwy. 224 across from State Hwy. sheds
s/o Kimball Jet. & State Hwy. 224 300' s/o
State Hwy. shed, s/o Kimball Jet.
Because the signs were already in place when the Jarmans
purchased the property (R. 209, p. 10) and because, during
negotiation of the lease, Reagan did not indicate that it
believed the leasehold included property not already occupied
by the signs (R. 209, p. 13), the Jarmans reasonably understood
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the leasehold description to include only that portion of the
property actually occupied by the signs

(R. 209, p. 12)

Reagan, on the other hand, has contended that the
lease allowed it to utilize any other portion of the Jarmans'
property in the event the portion occupied by the signs should
be sold or developed.

Reagan relies for this contention upon a

clause in the lease which purports to define the specific
events under which the lessor may terminate the lease.

That

clause reads:
Lessor shall have the right to terminate
this lease at any time during the term of
this lease if: (a) Lessor builds or
develops the property where the sign(s)
structure(s) is situated; or (b) in the
event Lessor sells the premises, the buyer
of said premise has the right to terminate
this lease within thirty (30) days
immediately following recordation of deed of
sale, if buyer gives lessee written notice
of termination. Lessee will remove its
sign(s) within thirty (30) days after
receiving a written copy of the deed or
valid building permit together with prepaid
unearned rent. If any portion of the
property is not utilized for such buildings,
Lessee has the option to use the remaining
portion on the same terms.
That language is ambiguous.

It states that the "[l]essor shall

have the right to terminate [the] lease . . . if:" and follows
up the "if:" with part

M

( a ) M and part M (b). M

Part M ( a ) M

arguably provides that the lessor may terminate the lease in
the event the lessor develops the property where the billboards
are located.

Part

M

( b ) M arguably provides that the eventual

purchaser of the property may terminate the lease upon thirty
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(30) days written notice within thirty (30) days after
recordation of the deed of sale.

It was Reagan's position at

trial, and continues to be Reagan's position that what parts
"(a)" and "(b)" give, the last sentence of the clause,
apparently included under part "(b)," takes away.

That

sentence uses the term, "such buildings" but part "(b)"
addresses sale of the land, not development.
of part

Even the portion

"(b)" which appears to rather clearly grant a

purchaser of the property a right to terminate is apparently
not clear; at least not to Reagan.

At trial, Reagan's vice

president, Terry Reid, testified that part "(b)" only "gives
the lessor a right to grant to a purchaser the right to
terminate.

(R. 209, p. 62). Reagan's lease is so written that

it is subject to numerous contradicting interpretations.
Without examination of extrinsic evidence the meaning of the
Reagan lease, like beauty, is in the eyes of the beholder.
Language is considered ambiguous if the
words used to express the meaning and
intention of the parties are insufficient in
a sense that the contract may be understood
to reach two or more plausible meanings.
American Bonding Co. v. Nelson, 763 P.2d 814, 816 (Utah App.
1988) .
Contrary to Reagan's conclusion, two or more meanings
are plausible from the language of the lease.

The leasehold

description provides that one sign would be located "300' s/o
State Hwy. shed. . . . "

The 300' distance was only an
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approximation; the actual distance never having been measured.
(R. 209, p. 39)

Mr. Jarman, applying the same method of

approximation, judged that distance to be 1,000 feet or more.
(R. 209, p. 16)
Reagan never obtained a metes and bounds measurement
to more closely define its leasehold nor did it ask Mr. Jarman
to provide one.

(R. 209, pp. 37, 16)

Without the actual

physical presence of the signs to define the extent of the
leasehold, the leasehold description is simply too ambiguous to
define Reagan's rights in the Jarmans' property without
examining extrinsic evidence.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT WAS BASED ON A PROPER AND
ACCURATE ASSESSMENT OF THE FACTS PRESENTED AT TRIAL.
The Reagan lease agreement is ambiguous.

This Court

has stated that:
. . . when a contract is ambiguous because
of uncertainty or incompleteness concerning
the parties' rights and duties under the
contract, extrinsic evidence is permissible
to ascertain the parties' intent.

Power Sys. & C o n t r o l s v. K e i t h ' s E l e c , 765 P.2d 5, 9 (Utah
App. 1988).

The trial court examined the extrinsic evidence

presented by both parties and, weighing that evidence, entered
judgment in the Jarmans' favor.

This Court has articulated a

standard granting significant deference to the trial court's
factual assessment.
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On appeal of a judgment from the bench after
trial, we defer to the trial court's factual
assessment unless there is clear error.
Copper State Leasing v. Blacker Appliance & Furniture, 770 P.2d
88, (Utah App. 1988) .
The trial court's determination was supported by the
facts presented by both parties.

In its brief, Reagan argues

that the extrinsic evidence presented at trial was "more than
sufficient to establish that Reagan had the right to relocate
its structures. . . . "
irrelevant.

This assertion, even if true, is

The question is not whether the court could have

found for Reagan had it credited Reagan's evidence, but rather
whether there was an evidentiary basis for finding for the
Jarmans.
Even when Reagan attempts to marshal1 the evidence
which could have supported a judgment in its favor, it points
to facts which actually support the judgment as entered.

For

example, the second "fact" upon which Reagan relies is that "no
exact description for the location of the Reagan structures was
affixed to the 1971 leases and no attempt to fix their exact
locations was made at the time the 1982 lease was executed."
(Appellant's brief at p.14).

This statement is as much as an

admission by Reagan that the agreement's leasehold description
is ambiguous and does not adequately define the exact location
of the billboards.

It also ignores testimony by Reagan's own

agent that the property description was written into the 1971
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leases before the signs were erected and that the eventual
erection of the signs then defined their precise location.

(R.

209, pp. 47, 48).
Reagan also states that Mr. Jarman admitted that the
leasehold description contained in the 1982 lease agreement
still describes the present location of the signs. Reagan
makes this assertion twice in its brief, neither time citing to
the record or any other authority.

However, Mr. Jarman's

testimony, which apparently was believed by the trial court,
was just the opposite.

(R. 209, pp. 26, 27).

Reagan's other contentions do not support reversal of
the judgment.

The assertion that it was Mr. Jarman*s intention

to allow Reagan to maintain two billboards on his property,
while true, adds no weight to Reagan's argument.

The two signs

which Mr. Jarman intended to allow Reagan to maintain were the
two signs already in place when the 1982 agreement was entered
into.

(R. 209, p. 12). He intended that they would remain

precisely where they were.

(R. 209, pp. 12, 28, 29).

The fact that the state paid Reagan to "relocate, not
remove," the structures is irrelevant.

The state was not a

party to the lease agreement nor could the state authorize
Reagan's trespass to the Jarmans' property.
Reagan suggests that it "never understood that it was
strictly limited with regard to the location of its signs."
Reagan presented testimony to that effect which was properly
considered and weighed by the court.
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Finally, Reagan argues that only a portion of each
sign was relocated.

The trial court correctly ruled that the

relocation, to the extent it took place, constituted a
trespass.

The defendant presents no authority for the •

proposition that this ruling is erroneous.

In short, instead

of detailing why the Court's findings were not supported by the
evidence, as is the appellant's burden, Reagan simply reargues
his case and requests that this Court substitute its judgment
for that of the trial court.

That is not the function of an

appellate court.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE SUPPORTED BY
THE EVIDENCE AND SUPPORT ITS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
ITS JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE JARMANS.
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides in pertinent part that:
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses.
The Reagan contract is ambiguous.

The trial court found facts

regarding the parties' intentions from evidence extrinsic to
the contract itself.

"Those findings may not be set aside on

appeal unless they are clearly erroneous under Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 52(a)."

Crowther v. Carter, 767 P.2d 129, 131

(Utah App. 1989) .
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The trial court's findings are supported by competent
and sufficient evidence and conform to that evidence.

Under

these circumstances, the appellate court must regard those
findings as sufficient.

Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998 (Utah

App. 1989).
Reagan argues that the trial court should have amended
its findings because Reagan, in its motion, pointed to evidence
which was contrary to the court's findings.

Reagan, in

essence, argues that the trial court should have amended its
findings, not because they lacked evidentiary support, but
merely because Reagan had presented certain conflicting
evidence which the court had not addressed in its findings.
A trial court need not resolve every
conflicting evidentiary issue, M[n]or is the
court required to negate allegations in its
findings of fact."
Sampson, supra at 56, quoting Sorenson v. Beers, 614 P.2d 159,
160 (Utah 1980) .
In bringing its Motion to Amend before the trial court
and its appeal before this Court, Reagan simply has not met its
burden in attacking the trial court's findings.

Reagan must do

much more than simply show the existence of conflicting
evidence.

In General Glass Corp. v. Mast Const. Co., 766 P.2d

429 (Utah App. 1988), a case cited in Reagan's brief, this
Court repeated what it has "said on numerous occasions;" that:
in order to challenge a finding of fact, it
is appellant's burden to marshall all the
evidence that supports the court's finding
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and then demonstrate why even viewing it in
the light most favorable to the court below,
it is insufficient to support the finding
made.
Id. at 433. Reagan has fallen far short of meeting this
burden.

It addresses virtually none of the evidence supporting

the trial court's findings.

It would, in fact, have this Court

believe that the only evidence in opposition to the "facts"
supporting Reagan's position is "the mere statement by Mr.
Jarman that he 'intended' the lease to be limited to sign
locations of 1982. . . . "

(Reagan's Brief, p. 15). Reagan's

insinuation is that Mr. Jarman's testimony was untrustworthy.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) recognizes the trial court's
superior opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
Reagan specifically challenges the trial court's
findings of fact numbers 2, 3, 4, 5 and 8.

Evidence was

presented at trial to support each of those findings.
The trial court found that the lease describes two
specific locations upon which Reagan was authorized to locate
two billboards.

The court had sufficient evidence upon which

to base that finding.

It is, first of all, uncontroverted that

the billboards were already in place when the Jarmans purchased
the property and later entered into the lease agreement with
Reagan.

(R. 209, p. 10, 14, 39, 48, 52). At the time the

lease was negotiated there was no discussion concerning the
extent of the leasehold.

(R. 209, p.12).

Mr. Jarman did not

feel there was a need to discuss the extent of the leasehold
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which he felt was defined by the actual placement of the
billboards.

(R. 209, p.12).

Mr. Richard Paxman, Jarmans'

representative, testified that once the billboards were
erected, their locations were defined.

(R. 209, p.47, 48).

The trial court also found that the 1971 leases
between Galaxy and Swindle each authorized the placement of one
billboard on a specific site —

"the site occupied by the

billboards at the time the lease between the plaintiffs and
defendant was signed."

The testimony discussed above, and

particularly Mr. Paxman's testimony, supports this finding.
The trial court provides its own evidentiary support
for its next finding, which states:
Based upon the property description in the
February 1982 Lease, the fact that the
billboards were in place at the time the
Lease was signed, and based upon the
testimony of Mr. Jarman that he intended to
lease defendant only the property upon which
the billboards were situated, the Court
finds that the parties intended the Lease to
continue the right of defendant to maintain
the billboards in their existing locations.
Reagan also challenges the trial court's finding that
the 1982 Lease is ambiguous and subject to the introduction and
consideration of parol evidence to aid in its interpretation.
The correctness of this finding is discussed in part I of
respondents' argument, above.
The only other finding challenged by Reagan in this
appeal is the court's finding that:
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Defendant removed the billboards from the
locations they occupied upon the execution
of the 1982 Lease then moved them to other
locations on plaintiff's property without
the knowledge or consent of the plaintiffs.
Reagan implies in its brief that the court believed Reagan
moved the billboards to a significantly different portion of
the Jarmans' 103 acre property and that the signs were moved in
their entirety.
understanding.

That clearly was not the trial court's
The court heard Mr. Paxman's testimony of

exactly how the billboards were relocated and that one beam of
each remained in place on Reagan's leasehold.
41-44).

(R. 209, pp.

The one critical fact remains; that Reagan, without

notice to the Jarmans or their consent (R. 209, pp. 19, 32),
moved the billboards onto a portion of the Jarmans' property
not contemplated under the terms of the agreement reached by
the parties.

That action constituted a trespass as much as if

Reagan had moved each billboard a mile.
Each of the trial court's findings are supported by
the evidence and judgment entered below should be affirmed by
this court.

CONCLUSION
If Reagan's appeal of the trial court's judgment has
merit, it has failed to show where that merit lies.

Instead of

addressing the evidence relied upon by the trial court in
reaching its decision, and demonstrating why that evidence was
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insufficient to support the trial court's findings, Reagan has
simply reargued to this Court the case which it argued below.
As much as Reagan might desire to have its appeal proceed as a
trial de novo, it is this Court's duty only to determine
whether the trial court's judgment was clearly erroneous.
Reagan has failed to show that the trial court committed any
error.

The Jarmans have, on the other hand, shown that each of

the trial court's findings which are disputed by Reagan are
supported by the evidence.

This Court should, therefore, rule

in favor of the respondents by affirming the trial court's
findings and judgment.
DATED this

day of June, 1989.
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

By J/crr\

Don R. Schow
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/
Respondents
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